Under the law of parties, presence at the scene along
with other actions made the evidence legally sufficient to prove the offense of
deadly conduct. [In the Matter of I.A.G.](09-4-7B)
On October 1, 2009, the Beaumont Court of Appeals
concluded that under the law of parties, respondent's presence and actions tend
to show his agreement to commit the offense of deadly conduct while engaged in
organized criminal activity as a member of a criminal street gang.
09-4-7B. In the Matter of I.A.G., No.
09-08-00430-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2009 WL 3126241 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, 10/01/09).
Facts:On the afternoon of May 7, 2008, I.A.G.,
and others, were involved in an altercation that occurred in the front yard of
the complaining witness's home (hereinafter referred to as the homeowner).
While attempting to stop the altercation, the homeowner, who had not initially
been involved in the fight, and I.A.G., who had been a party in the fight,
exchanged blows. During the altercation, the homeowner heard I.A.G. say North
Side several times, which the homeowner explained he understood to be
gang-related. According to the homeowner, North Side
is a gang in Port Arthur, and the homeowner had seen that name written on walls
throughout the city. Ultimately, the homeowner told the group to leave, and they
left. The homeowner called the police, who then sent an officer.
Later that day, the homeowner, while away from his
home, was notified that some individuals had thrown rocks and tire irons in his
yard. The homeowner returned to his house and called the police. Before the
police arrived, an Explorer stopped in front of the home. I.A.G., along with
three others got out. I.A.G. and one of the others held tire irons while
standing near the Explorer. The homeowner explained that under the
circumstances, including the earlier altercation, he felt threatened and he
feared serious bodily injury. The homeowner also stated that despite the fact
that I.A.G. and the other person only displayed the tire irons, he felt
threatened.
Shortly after exiting the Explorer, the driver asked
the homeowner, 'Why you hitting little kids?' While standing behind the
Explorer, the driver then pointed a pistol at the homeowner. At that point, the
homeowner instructed his father to go inside, after which the gunman said,
'I'm going to kill you. I'm going to kill you.' The homeowner testified that
this also caused him to fear imminent danger of serious bodily injury and to
believe that the gunman was going to kill him. After he was threatened with
being killed, the homeowner turned around, entered his house, and heard I.A.G.
say, 'Go, go, go, go, he's going to get his gun.' I.A.G. and the others then
left. The homeowner, once again, called the police.
The homeowner testified that he felt the two youths
holding the tire irons acted in concert with the gunman. With respect to whether
any gang was specifically mentioned during the confrontation involving the gun,
the homeowner acknowledged that the gunman never mentioned any gang.
A Port Arthur police officer with the street crimes
unit with a specialty in gangs, street gangs also testified at trial. The
officer indicated that I.A.G. and the other minor that participated in the
gunman's confrontation with the homeowner had previously been wounded in a
drive-by shooting while at a known Norte 14 gang hangout. Additionally, the
officer testified that I.A.G. told him that he was a member of the North Side 14
gang. The officer stated that the gunman, who owned the Explorer, was also a
member of the Norte 14 gang. The officer added that the other minor who
participated in the confrontation that involved the gunman also held membership
in the Norte 14 gang, which he based on the minor's admission as well as tattoos
on that minor's wrists that together read North Side 14. The officer expressed
his opinion that on May 7, 2008, the gunman and two minors had acted in concert
as members of their gang in threatening the homeowner.
A second Port Arthur police officer that also
investigated the confrontation testified at trial. According to the second
officer, the homeowner told him that he felt threatened and feared being shot.
The second officer confirmed that he was familiar with the participants in the
confrontation, and he knew them all to be members of the Norte 14 gang.
I.A.G. also argues that the evidence is legally
insufficient to show that he committed or conspired to commit deadly conduct. As
defined by statute, [d]eadly conduct occurs when one recklessly engages in
conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.
Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 22.05(a)(Vernon
2003). Under
section 22.05,
[r]ecklessness and danger are presumed if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm
at or in the direction of another whether or not the actor believed the firearm
to be loaded.
Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 22.05(c)
(Vernon 2003).
Held:Affirmed
Opinion:In his brief, I.A.G. concedes that [b]y
pointing the gun in the direction of [the homeowner], [the gunman] satisfied the
'recklessness' and 'danger' elements of
section 22.05.
Nevertheless, I.A.G. contends that the gunman acted alone and that I.A.G.'s
presence with the tire iron and his participation in the earlier altercation
with the homeowner provides no additional evidence to make the connection that
[I.A.G.] intended to threaten [the homeowner] with a firearm.
Under Texas law, the law of parties enlarges upon a
person's potential criminal responsibility for acts that involve others. See
Tex. Pen.Code Ann. §Â§ 7.01,
7.02 (Vernon 2003).
Under the law of parties, a person is criminally responsible for the offense of
another, and can be convicted as a party, if, acting with intent to promote or
assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or
attempts to aid the other person committing the offense.
Tex. Pen.Code Ann. §Â§ 7.01,
7.02.
In applying the law of parties, the defendant's
physical presence at the scene is a factor used in evaluating whether the
defendant acted with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the
offense. Evidence is sufficient to convict under the law of parties where the
defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages
its commission by words or other agreement.
Ransom v. State,
920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)
(op. on reh'g);
Davis v. State,
195 S.W.3d 311, 320 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
Though mere presence does not automatically make one a party to a crime, it is a
circumstance tending to prove party status and, when considered with other
facts, may be sufficient to prove that the defendant was a participant.
Davis,
195 S.W.3d at 320.
In determining whether I.A.G. is responsible for the
gunman's act of threatening the homeowner with a gun under the law of parties,
we review events occurring before, during, and after the offense and may rely on
actions of the defendant that show an understanding and common design to commit
the offense.
Ransom,
920 S.W.2d at 302;
Davis,
195 S.W.3d at 320. While there is no
question that the gunman, and not I.A.G., held the gun while it was pointed at
the homeowner, the court's charge allowed the jury to consider I.A.G.'s
responsibility for the gunman's act under the law of the parties instruction.
Relying on
Wooden v. State,
101 S.W.3d 542 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd),
I.A.G. argues that his mere presence at the home is insufficient to support a
finding that he committed deadly conduct. But here, the evidence shows more than
I.A.G.'s mere presence at the scene. Hours before the confrontation, I.A.G. had
been involved in a fight with the homeowner and then returned with others under
circumstances tending to show the group anticipated and planned to again
confront the homeowner in retaliation for the fight that had occurred earlier
that day. While circumstantial, there is sufficient evidence that the three
agreed to act in concert to threaten the homeowner. We conclude that I.A.G.'s
presence and actions tend to show his agreement to commit the offense as well as
encouragement of the gunman's acts. See
Ransom,
920 S.W.2d at 302. Therefore, we find the
evidence sufficient to support a conviction under the law of parties. Id.
Conclusion:In summary, we find the evidence
legally sufficient to prove that I.A.G., under the law of parties, committed
deadly conduct while engaged in organized criminal activity as a member of a
criminal street gang. See
Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319;
Evans,
202 S.W.3d at 161. Having addressed
I.A.G.'s arguments, we overrule issue one.