Warrantless arrest was reasonable were respondent
only addressed his constitutional complaints.[Rangel v. State](09-2-6A)
On March 4, 2009, the Waco Court of Appeals held that
since trial counsel did not specifically mention Chapter 14 in his
warrantless-arrest objection; he mentioned only state and federal constitutional
provisions and
article 38.23,
he failed to preserve his Chapter 14 complaint for appeal.
09-2-6A. Rangel v. State, MEMORANDUM, No.
10-07-00247-CR, 2009 WL 540780 (Tex.App.- Waco, 3/4/09).
Facts: A jury found Jerry Rangel guilty of
aggravated sexual assault and assessed punishment at life in prison. Asserting
four issues, Rangel appeals.
Rangel's first issue contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence recovered during an unlawful
warrantless arrest. Initially, we address the State's contention that Rangel
failed to preserve part of this complaint for appellate review. As the State
began to offer evidence about the apartment in which Rangel was arrested,
Rangel's trial counsel objected based on the police officer's warrantless entry
into the apartment and the warrantless arrest of Rangel. The trial court
overruled that objection. Trial counsel then stated the grounds for his
objection: It's based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution;
Article I, Section 9
and
10 of the Texas Constitution;
and
Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.
Held: Affirmed
Memorandum Opinion: The Court of Criminal Appeals
recently wrote:
In order to preserve an issue for appellate
review, a timely and specific objection is required.
Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A);
Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(1);
Gillenwaters v. State,
205 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).
A specific objection is necessary to inform the trial judge of the issue and
basis of the objection, and to allow the judge a chance to rule on the issue
at hand.
Neal v. State,
150 S.W.3d 169, 178 (Tex.Crim.App.2004),
citing
Zillender v. State,
557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
As we stated in
Lankston v. State,
827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Crim.App.1992),
all the party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a complaint on appeal is
to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to
it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time
when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.
Beyond this, there are no specific words or technical considerations
required for an objection to ensure that the issue will be preserved for
appeal. Id. If the correct ground of exclusion was apparent to the
judge and opposing counsel, no waiver results from a general or imprecise
objection. Id. at 908, citing
Zillender,
557 S.W.2d at 517.
Layton v. State,
--- S.W.3d ----, ----, 2009 WL 250080, at *2-3 (Tex.Crim.App. Feb. 4, 2009).
Chapter 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs
warrantless arrests in Texas. See
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 14.03,
14.05
(Vernon 2005 & Supp.2008). Rangel's trial counsel did not specifically mention
Chapter 14 in his warrantless-arrest objection; he mentioned only state and
federal constitutional provisions and
article 38.23,
Texas' statutory exclusionary rule. Id.
art. 38.23
(Vernon 2005). In a nearly identical case involving a written motion to
suppress, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the defendant's suppression
motion, which cited the same constitutional provisions and
article 38.23,
failed to alert the trial court or opposing counsel that defense counsel was
invoking Chapter 14 and that the defendant thus failed to preserve his Chapter
14 complaint for appeal.
Buchanan v. State,
207 S.W.3d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).
Applying Buchanan, we hold that it was not obvious to the trial court
that Rangel was also raising a Chapter 14 argument and that Rangel did not
preserve it for appellate review. See id. We therefore will only address
his constitutional complaint on the warrantless arrest.
We review a trial court's admission or exclusion of
evidence for abuse of discretion.
McDonald v. State,
179 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).
We review a suppression ruling under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See
Montanez v. State,
195 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).
We afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of
historical facts but review de novo its ruling on mixed questions of law and
fact that do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.
Neal v. State,
256 S.W.3d 264, 281 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).
If the trial court does not make explicit findings of historical facts, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.
Walter v. State,
28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
Because in this case the trial court did not make explicit findings, we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.
Neither the United States Constitution, nor
Article I, Section 9
contains a requirement that an arrest be authorized by an arrest warrant. An
arrest that is otherwise reasonable will not be found to be in violation of
either provision because it was not authorized by an arrest warrant.
Buchanan v. State,
175 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005),
rev'd on other grounds,
207 S.W.3d 772 (Tex.Crim.App.2006)
(citing
Hulit v. State,
982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)).
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court's ruling, we hold that Rangel's warrantless arrest was
reasonable. Inez, the grandmother of 13-month-old E.A. and the person paying the
apartment's rent, found her in the early afternoon on a bed naked, unconscious,
and bleeding vaginally. Rangel, who stayed overnight in the apartment a couple
of nights a week with E.A .'s mother, was asleep on the bedroom floor with his
belt buckle undone after being out all night with E.A.'s mother, whom Inez had
taken to work early that morning. Inez relayed that information to her employer,
who relayed it to the police just before they entered the apartment and found
Rangel still asleep. We overrule Rangel's first issue.
Conclusion: We affirm the trial court's judgment.